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INTRODUCTION
[1] Half man, half bull, the Minotaur was the most fearsome monster in
Greek mythology. Human torso and bull’s head, its horns were sharp as
knives, its great hooves could kick the life out the strongest of heroes, and
its food was human flesh. Yet under the surface, the Minotaur’s myth was
sad; his insatiable existence originated in jealousy and lust.
[2] The myth of the Minotaur can be used as a mirror for the modern life,
in which fiction and reality are rapidly converging, as humans develop the
knowledge to create hybrid humanoid creatures. This article uses the
possibility of the creation of a Minotaur as a backdrop to revisit and
analyze the rationales for the current patent policy on biotechnological
inventions that transcend the human-animal barrier.1 The objectives of
this article are to (i) discuss the possibility of creating a human-animal
chimera, 2 (ii) shed light on the current law regulating patentability of
chimeras, (iii) consider important issues external to law, and (iv) address
the question of who should decide the patentability of the Minotaur.
*

Associate, Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione, Chicago, Illinois; J.D., University of
Wisconsin Law School; Ph.D., University of Nebraska-Lincoln; M.S., University of Novi
Sad, Yugoslavia. Sincere thanks to Pilar Ossorio for helpful suggestions.
1
See, e.g., Oliver Brustle et al., Chimeric Brains Generated by Intraventricular
Transplantation of Fetal Human Brain Cells into Embryonic Rats, 16 NATURE BIOTECH.
1040 (1998) (engrafting of human embryonic stem cells onto rat brains).
2
Chimera is “an organism composed of two or more genetically distinct tissues . . . or an
artificially produced individual having tissues of several species.” RANDOM HOUSE
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 359 (2d ed. 1993).
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[3] It is not surprising that biotechnology discoveries dominate much of
the contemporary discussion about patent law. Biotechnology is central to
the current debate because the biotech industry is extremely patentdependent 3 and has exposed fundamental uncertainties that plague the
theory and principles of patent protection. Biotech patenting is a forum in
which deeper questions regarding patent policy are being played out. 4
That those questions are still far from being resolved underscores the
implausibility of securing consensus on matters of substantive patent law
in the near future.
[4] Recent advances in genetics and other areas of biology have increased
the fear and controversy over the effects of research with genetically
modified organisms. 5 Groups opposed to transgenic research have
advanced various areas of concern. These groups have chiefly attacked
the prospect of cloning humans; at times, they have also opposed the
production and patenting of transgenic animals. 6
3

Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 472 (1995).
See Verbatim Transcript of Comm. on Intellectual Prop. in Genomic and Protein
Research Innovation, National Academy of Sciences (Feb. 27, 2004) (transcript on file
with National Academies),
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/Genomics_Committee_Meeting_1_transcript.pd
f (discussing the tasks of this recently established committee which include the review of
patenting and licensing of human genetic material and proteins).
5
See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN
DIGNITY (2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/; U.S.
CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
PATENTING LIFE-SPECIAL REPORT (1989), available at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html; U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE
AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT (1987), available at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The
Ethics of Patenting DNA (July 20, 2002),
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/patentingdna/publication_310.html;
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Animal-to-Human Transplants: The Ethics of
Xenotransplantation (Mar. 1, 1996),
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/xenotransplantations/publication_299.html;
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (Apr. 1, 1995),
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/humantissue/publication_298.html.
6
See Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 1556 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 110-18 (1989) (statement of John A. Hoyt, President, Humane
4
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[5] In the United States, human-animal chimeras are not statutorily
excluded from patentability, but the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
has announced that it will not issue patents for such creations. 7 Although
the basis for this exclusion is unclear, it has been suggested that it derives
from the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 8 In the
European Union (E.U.), the exclusion of human-related materials from
patentability has a statutory basis in the European Patent Commission
(EPC) pursuant to the incorporation of Directive 98/44, which determines
that the human body, in its various stages of development, is not
patentable. 9 In the E.U., patents cannot issue for human cloning
Society of the United States) (expressing concern that granting of animal patents will
present society with new animal health and welfare problems, and declaring the Humane
Society's support for the enactment of the moratorium); id. at 124-33 (statement of Dr.
Michael W. Fox, Vice President/Bioethics and Farm Animals Division, Humane Society
of the United States) (describing physiological abnormalities that transgenic animals have
displayed); id. at 237 (statement of Dr. Margaret Mellon, Director, National
Biotechnology Center, National Wildlife Federation) (declaring NWF support for the
moratorium until federal regulatory system is implemented); id. at 266 (statement of
Andrew Kimbrell, Policy Director, Foundation on Economic Trends, on behalf of the
Coalition on Animal Patenting) (declaring that the organization, which includes
seventeen animal protection groups and twenty six religious leaders, supports the
legislative moratorium on animal patenting); Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues
in Patenting New Animal Life, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 399, 411 (1988) (outlining religious
objections to transgenic animal patents, including (1) objectification and exploitation of
animal life; and (2) destruction of species integrity); David Manspeizer, Note, The
Cheshire Cat, the March Hare, and the Harvard Mouse: Animal Patents Open Up a New,
Genetically-Engineered Wonderland, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 417, 437-40 (1991)
(describing religious concerns about transgenic animal patents as “[m]an is playing God,”
and expressing concern that animal patenting will lead to patenting of genetically altered
human beings); see also Darrell G. Dotson, Comment, The European Controversy Over
Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 919, 943-44 (1997) (quoting EP
Greens Launch a Campaign Against the Draft EEC Directive on Patenting
Biotechnological Inventions, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 1992).
7
See Donald J. Quigg, Statement by Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks, Patent and Trademark Office Notice: Animals-Patentability, 1077 O.G.
TM 24 (1987).
8
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Rachel E. Fishman, Patenting Human Beings: Do SubHuman Creatures Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 472-80
(1989) (rejecting this ground for exclusion, as the thirteenth amendment prohibits human
servitude, not a right to combine human and animal genes); see Quigg, supra note 8.
9
Council Directive 98/44, ¶ 38, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13,16 (EC), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_213/l_21319980730en00130021.pdf.
“[P]rocesses, the use of which offend against human dignity, such as processes to

3
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processes, or processes for modifying the germ line identity of human
beings. In addition, uses of embryos for industrial or commercial
application are unpatentable. 10
[6] The patent regimes of both the United States and the European Union
contain uncertainties in their terminology. In the United States, neither the
PTO nor the judicial system has determined what constitutes a “human”
and what constitutes an “animal.” Although the unpatentable inventions
that relate to human beings are somewhat specified in European patent
law, 11 their definitions still remain unclear. The EPC does not give a
definition for what constitutes a “human being” and what constitutes an
“animal.” Some scholars have argued that the generation of clear
definitions of these materials and processes is of paramount importance. 12
However, in view of the rapidly advancing biotechnological research and
innovations, perhaps a more productive approach would be to generate
rules or standards for determining which organisms should and should not
be patentable. As biotechnology rapidly advances, it is plausible that the
definitions could become outdated and inaccurate in the near future.
[7] Opponents of patenting human-animal chimeras have raised a litany
of criticisms ranging from philosophical objections to property rights, to
fictional organismal horribles. Many concerns elicit a worst-case scenario
of the perceived risks of biotechnological advances. Such concerns are
often based on premonitions. Because many of the original risks that
opponents of biotechnology foresaw have not eventuated over the past 20
years, the opponents now bear the procedural burden of proving danger
from experimentation, rather than requiring the proponents of
biotechnology research to prove safety. 13 The most passionate arguments
produce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells of humans and animals, are
obviously also excluded from patentability.” Id.
10
Id. at ¶ 42.
11
Id. at art. 5-6.
12
Fishman, supra note 8, at 477-80; see Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human
Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 259 (1996).
13
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, Splicing Life: The Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic
Engineering with Human Beings, at 12-13 (1982), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/documents/pcemr/splicinglife.pdf; see Andy
Coghlan, Landmark Report Aims to Lay Frankenfood Scares to Rest, 179 NEW SCIENTIST
6 (2003).

4

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XII, Issue 2

against genetic engineering have been based upon moral, ethical, and
philosophical grounds. Being based on personal beliefs, they have proven
difficult to resolve through legislative and judicial pronouncements. 14
[8] Congress created the patent system to promote technological research
and innovation for the benefit of society. The United States patent system
hinges on a principle of neutrality, whereby the system neither supports
nor discriminates against technologies. 15 Hence, patents for chimeras
should not be prohibited simply because they may entail risk. Any
perceived risks could adequately be addressed through regulatory vehicles,
such as research regulation.
[9] Potential dangers found in the invention should not be an obstacle to
granting patents on life forms. Patent law is predicated on the concept that
technological advances are for public good. 16 On one occasion in the past,
the legislature has excluded a form of otherwise patentable subject
matter. 17 However, analogies between that legislation, motivated by
national security, and the speculative risks of transgenic research remain
dubious. 18
14

See Michael E. Sellers, Patenting Nonnaturally Occurring, Man-Made Life: A
Practical Look at the Economic, Environmental, and Ethical Challenges Facing Animal
Patents, 47 ARK. L. REV. 269, 290-91 (1994).
15
Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 1556 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 96 (1989) (statement of Donald S. Chisum, Professor,
University of Washington School of Law) (emphasizing that the patent system is
objective, and that it does not promote any one technology or industry); see Reagen A.
Kulseth, Biotechnology and Animal Patents: When Someone Builds a Better Mouse, 32
ARIZ. L. REV. 691, 710 (1990) (maintaining that the patent system should remain
ethically neutral); see also Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 182 (1987) (testimony of Robert P. Merges,
Professor, Columbia School of Law) (arguing that patent system is not correct forum for
weighing technologies).
16
Dresser, supra note 6, at 404.
17
In 1954, Congress enacted a prohibition on the patenting of nuclear weapons
technology. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2003).
18
See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System
and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1067 (1988) (distinguishing
Congress’ reason for placing prohibition on nuclear weapons technology from the
rationale to enact similar prohibition against biotechnological innovations).

5
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[10] Biotechnology has changed our understanding of ourselves, nature,
and of our place in nature. Biotechnology carries risks, while helping us
harness life and offering hope for life’s improvement. It promises to
profoundly change lives, both human and non-human. As this Article will
highlight, there is a need for a more thoughtful conceptualization of
biotechnology, and for more careful control over its development, use, and
legal protection.
FEASIBILITY STUDY
[11] Before embarking onto a purely academic discourse, it is prudent to
examine the current state of science and evaluate the degree of concern
regarding our capability for creation of human-animal chimeras. Simply
stated, our current command of genetic engineering might be insufficient
for creation of such organismal hybrids. If the prospects for creating
human-animal chimeras are distant enough (whatever that might mean),
then perhaps the most prudent decision will be to endow the future
generations with the difficult decision-making on the regulation of
patenting such creatures.
[12] Chimeras have been with us for some time, and not only in Greek
mythology. 19 Prior to the times when the tools of molecular biology
became available, humans began creating chimeras through
xenotransplantation, transplanting organs from one species into another
(including themselves).
[13] The first documented heterologous bone graft was performed in
1668, when the Dutch surgeon Dr. Job van Meekeren used a bone graft
from a dog’s skull to repair a defect in a human cranium. 20 In 1905, the
19

In Greek mythology, chimera (Greek Χιμαιρα) was one of the offspring of Typhon and
Echidna. Although descriptions vary, most frequently the chimera was depicted with the
body of a goat, the hindquarters of a snake or dragon and the head of a lion. Chimera’s
offspring by Orthros were the Sphinx and the Nemean Lion. Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page, (search for “Chimera (creature)”); see also
EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 137 (1942) (providing a description of Chimera as well
as the story of Chimera’s death).
20
Barend Haeseker, Van Meekeren and His Account of the Transplant of Bone from a
Dog into the Skull of a Soldier, 88 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 173, 173-74
(1991).
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French surgeon Dr. M. Princeteau grafted pieces of a rabbit kidney into a
16-year-old patient with kidney failure. 21 In 1920, monkey testicles were
transplanted into humans for the first time. 22 Notwithstanding the wisdom
of such procedures, hundreds of men were reported to have received
testicles transplanted from primates. 23
[14] Other examples of xenotransplants include renal transplantation from
baboon to man. 24 A highly debated transplant of baboon bone marrow
into an AIDS patient took place in 1995. 25 Clinicians regard pigs,
however, as a preferred donor for xenotransplants, largely because they
tend to be healthier and reproduce faster than primates. 26 Pig fetal brain
cells have been transplanted into patients with Parkinson’s disease and
with Huntington’s disease. 27 In general, clinical xenotransplantation of
organs may become a widely accepted procedure. 28
[15] Recent advances in genetic engineering have enabled researchers to
more skillfully and precisely perform interspecies transplantations of cells,
tissues, and organs. Molecular biologists created animal-animal chimeras

21

David M. Hume, Early Experiences in Organ Homotransplantation in Man and the
Unexpected Sequelae Thereof, 137 AM. J. SURGERY 152, 153 (1979).
22
In 1920, Dr. Serge Voronoff began transplanting monkey testicles into aging men.
John E. Morley & Horace M. Perry III, Androgen Deficiency in Aging Men: Role of
Testosterone Replacement Therapy, 135 J. LAB. & CLINICAL MED. 370, 370-71 (2000).
23
Thierry Gillyboeuf, The Famous Doctor Who Inserts Monkeyglands in Millionaires, 9
SPRING 44, 45 (2000).
24
See generally T.E. Starzl et al., Renal Heterotransplantation from Baboon to Man:
Experience With 6 Cases, 2 TRANSPLANTATION 752 (1964).
25
Sally Lehrman, AIDS Patient Given Baboon Bone Marrow, 378 NATURE 756, 756
(1995).
26
Traci J. Hoffman, Organ Donor Laws in the U.S. and the U.K.: The Need for Reform
and the Promise of Xenotransplantation, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 370
(2000); see Anthony Dorling et al., Clinical Xenotransplantation of Solid Organs, 349
LANCET 867, 868 (1997).
27
J.S. Fink et al., Porcine Xenografts in Parkinson's Disease and Huntington’s Disease
Patients: Preliminary Results, 9 CELL TRANSPLANT 273–278 (2000); see generally
Oliver Brüstle & Ronald DG McKay, Neuronal Progenitors as Tools for Cell
Replacement in the Nervous System, 6 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 688 (1996).
28
See Dorling, supra note 26, at 867; see generally Stanley W. Jacob et al.,
Transplantation of Tissues, 98 AM. J. SURGERY 55 (1959) (surgical review article).
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in the mid-1980s. 29 In 1988, elements of the human immune system were
imported into mice. 30 It is now possible to transplant embryonic stem
cells from pigs into humans to grow new organs. 31 Embryonic stem cells
have been created by nuclear transfer of human somatic nuclei into rabbit
oocytes. 32 Researchers used a human-sheep xenograft model to determine
“whether long-term engrafting haematopoietic stem cells (HSC) are
susceptible to human cytomegalovirus (HCMV) infection.” 33 These
examples illustrate the extent to which humans have been proactively
involved in creating human-animal chimeras over centuries.
[16] There is no doubt that the techniques that enable genetic engineering
of human-animal chimeras are already in place or are being developed. In
2004, for example, British scientists received permission to clone human
embryos for medical research. 34 Notwithstanding the political
controversies and regulations on cloning and stem cell research that vary
around the world, chances are that in your lifetime, dear reader, humans
29

See Carole B. Fehilly et al., Interspecific Chimaerism Between Sheep and Goat, 307
NATURE 634 (1984) (describing how researchers in Cambridge created a “geep,” an
animal that was part goat and part sheep, by allowing a pair of sheep and a pair of goats
to mate naturally, and manipulating the embryos obtained); see also Sabine MeineckeTillmann, Experimental Chimaeras - Removal of Reproductive Barrier Between Sheep
and Goat, 307 NATURE 637, 637 (1984).
30
See Alberto Gobbi et al., Human Herpesvirus 6 Causes Severe Thymocyte Depletion in
SCID-hu Thy/Liv Mice, 189 J. EXP. MED. 1953 (1999); D.E. Mossier et al., Resistance to
Human Immunodeficiency Virus 1 Infection of SCID Mice Reconstituted with Peripheral
Blood Leukocytes from Donors Vaccinated with Caccinia gp160 and Recombinant
gp160, 90 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2443–47 (1993).
31
Smadar Eventov-Friedman et al., Embryonic Pig Liver, Pancreas, and Lung As a
Source for Transplantation: Optimal Organogenesis Without Teratoma Depends on
Distinct Time Windows, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2928, 2928 (2005), available at
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/102/8/2928.
32
Ying Chen et al., Embryonic Stem Cells Generated by Nuclear Transfer of Human
Somatic Nuclei into Rabbit Oocytes, 13 CELL RESEARCH 251, 251 (2003), available at
http://www.cell-research.com/20034/251.htm.
33
Kirsten B. Crapnell et al., Human Haematopoietic Stem Cells that Mediate Long-Term
In Vivo Engraftment Are Not Susceptible to Infection by Human Cytomegalovirus, 124
BRIT. J. HAEMATOLOGY 676, 676 (2004).
34
Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, HFEA Grants the First Therapeutic
Cloning Licence for Research (Aug. 11, 2004),
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/PressOffice/Archive/1092233888. The Human Fertilization and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) allowed researchers at the Newcastle Centre for Life to
create embryos as a source of stem cells to cure diseases.
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will possess the knowledge and the skill to create a Minotaur in vitro.
That proposition also represents the salvation of this article.
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW AND PATENTING OF LIFE FORMS
[17] Few restrictions on patenting living organisms exist in the United
States. United States patents on eukaryotes have been issued since 1873. 35
In 1980, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “anything under the sun that is
made by man” is patentable subject matter, including living organisms. 36
The landmark Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision boosted the investment
into, and the progress of, biotechnology research. Five years later, the
Chakrabarty principle was extended to non-naturally occurring, manmade plants, which were deemed patentable under 35 USC § 101. 37 In
1987, in Ex Parte Allen, multicellular animals (oysters) were found to be
patentable subject matter. 38 Upholding the Chakrabarty mantra, the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that created organisms such as newly
developed plant breeds are patentable subject matter.39
[18] Although human organisms have not been patented in the United
States, human material, including cells, is routinely patented. 40 It is
interesting to observe the evolution of achievements in genetic
engineering and the concomitant grant of patents for cellular, tissue, and
35

Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 443, 447 (1999). In 1873, Louis Pasteur was granted a patent to a purified
form of yeast. Improvement in the Manufacture of Beer and Yeast, U.S. Patent No.
141,072 (filed May 9, 1873) (issued July 22, 1873); Magnani, supra note 36, at 447.
36
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 313 (1980). Chakrabarty’s application
consisted of claims on the method of producing bacteria, on the bacteria themselves, and
on the process of using the bacteria to digest oil spills. Id. at 305-06; see Magnani, supra
note 36, at 447. In the end, all three types of claims were allowed. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 305-06, 318; see Magnani, supra note 36, at 447. The Court reasoned that
Congress, in passing 35 USC § 101, did not distinguish between inanimate objects and
living things as to patentable subject matter. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
37
Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 447 (B.P.A.I. 1985).
38
Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1425-26 (B.P.A.I. 1987). Despite holding
that multicellular animals were patentable, the Board rejected the Allen declaration on
grounds of obviousness due to a previous publication. See id. at 1427.
39
J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001).
40
See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 481-82 (Cal.
1990); George J. Annas, Outrageous Fortune: Selling Other People’s Cells, 20
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov./Dec. 1990, at 36, 36-39.
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organismal chimeras. Patents on molecular chimeras were acquired in the
1980’s, as biotechnology continued to advance. 41 Two decades later, the
level of sophistication in genetic engineering has increased, and
consequently so has the scope of allowed patent claims. 42 A multitude of
patents have now been granted for compositions and methods that
encompass various types of eukaryotic molecules, cells, and tissues; some
of these are of human origin. 43 The allowance of such patent claims
reflects our acceptance of the presence of some human cells in an animal
(and conversely, the presence of some non-human cells in a human). 44
What might give us pause would perhaps be visible phenotypical

41

Process for Producing Biologically Functional Molecular Chimeras, U.S. Patent No.
4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979) (issued Dec. 2, 1980) (covering a method and compositions
for replication and expression of exogenous genes in microorganisms, including plasmid
chimeras); see, e.g., Processes for Inserting DNA Into Eucaryotic Cells and for Producing
Proteinaceous Materials, U.S. Patent No. 4,399,216 (filed Feb. 25, 1980) (issued Aug. 16,
1983) (claiming a process for inserting foreign DNA into a eucaryotic cell, such that
foreign DNA becomes incorporated into the chromosomal DNA of said eucaryotic cell).
42
See, e.g., Chimeric Viral Proteins, U.S. Patent No. 6,436,648 (filed Mar. 26, 2001)
(issued Aug. 20, 2002) (claiming nucleic acid constructs coding for chimeric viral
proteins); Human Protease Molecules, U.S. Patent No. 6,855,811 (filed Sept. 26, 2001)
(issued Feb.15, 2005) (claiming chimeric antibodies).
43
See, e.g., In Vivo Use of Human Bone Marrow for Investigation and Production, U.S.
Patent No. 5,633,426 (filed Feb. 10, 1994) (issued May 27, 1997) (claiming that
“chimeric immunocompromised hosts are provided, comprising human bone marrow of
at least [four] weeks from the time of implantation”); see also Mice Models of Human
Prostate Cancer Progression, U.S. Patent No. 6,107,540 (filed Oct. 15, 1997) (issued
Aug. 22, 2000) (claiming to produce an immune deficient mouse containing a human
prostate xenograft of locally advanced or metastatic prostate cancer); Transgenic NonHuman Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (issued Apr. 12, 1988)
(claiming to produce the famous Harvard “oncomouse,” containing an activated
oncogene sequence); Calcification Mitigation of Bioprosthetic Implants, U.S. Patent No.
5,002,566 (filed Apr. 18, 1989) (issued Mar. 26, 1991) (claiming to produce bioprosthetic
implants made from tanned biological materials, such as porcine heart valves and bovine
pericardium); Transgenic Non-Human Mammals Expressing Human Coagulation Factor
VIII and Von Willebrand Factor, U.S. Patent No. 6,518,482 (filed May 7, 2001) (issued
Feb. 11, 2003); Transgenic Mouse Expressing a Polynucleotide Encoding a Human
Ataxin-2 Polypeptide, U.S. Patent No. 6,515,197 (filed Aug. 24, 2000) (issued Feb. 4,
2003); Transgenic Mice Expressing Mutant Human APP and Forming Congo Red
Staining Plaques, U.S. Patent No. 6,509,515 (filed Mar. 2, 1999) (issued Jan. 21, 2003)
(claiming mice expressing Alzheimer amyloid precursor proteins (APP)).
44
Pig heart valves are now routinely transplanted into people with heart disease; ask
Jesse Helms.
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characteristics that transcend the interspecies boundary. A bull’s head on
a human torso would certainly raise a few eyebrows.
[19] To erase any doubt on the controversial subject of patenting life, the
PTO issued a statement after Allen, clarifying that it considered
“nonnaturally occurring nonhuman multicellular organisms, including
animals, to be patentable subject matter.” 45 At the same time, the PTO
excluded humans from patentability on the grounds that “[t]he grant of a
limited, but exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the
Constitution.” 46 Remarkably, the PTO Commissioner did not specify the
precise language in the Constitution that prohibits patenting human beings,
but some believe that he was referring to the Thirteenth Amendment 47 ban
on human slavery. 48
[20] At the time, the basis for precluding patents on humans was
overshadowed by the immediate concerns of whether the scientifically
possible transgenic animals should become patentable. 49 In 1988, the
PTO issued the first patent for a transgenic mammal containing
heterologous DNA. 50 The patent was for the famous Harvard oncomouse,
which contains a human gene that makes it predisposed to breast cancer. 51

45

Magnani, supra note 35, at 448.
Id.
47
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
48
Magnani, supra note 36, at 448; see, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human
Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1647-49 (1993); Kevin D.
DeBre’, Patents on People and the U.S. Constitution: Creating Slaves or Enslaving
Science?, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221, 229-33 (1989); Fishman, supra note 8, at 462;
Jasemine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in the United
States, Europe, and Japan: How Much Patent Policy is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 223, 230-31 (2002).
49
Indeed, the first transgenic animal patent issued explicitly excluded humans from its
claims. Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22,
1984) (issued April 12, 1988).
50
See Keith Schneider, Harvard Gets Mouse Patent, a World First, N. Y. TIMES, Apr.
12, 1988, at A1. For a discussion of the implications of this invention on biotechnology
patents, see generally Carrie F. Walter, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: Current Patent
Practice and the Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent Law, 73 IND. L.J.
1025 (1998).
51
Magnani, supra note 35, at 448; see also Mark Dowie, Gods and Monsters, MOTHER
JONES, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 49, available at
46
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The PTO continues to issue patents on animals and on human cells lines.
In a publicized case, a patent on a human cell line was obtained by
physicians of the University of California at Los Angeles for a cell line
made from T-lymphocytes, which they isolated from their patient John
Moore while treating him for leukemia. 52
[21] In 1998, Stuart Newman and Jeremy Rifkin filed a provocative
patent application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 53
The application disclosed constructive reduction to practice 54 of humananimal chimeras that could be up to fifty percent human. 55 Newman and
Rifkin filed the chimera patent in an attempt to raise awareness of this
looming question in patent law, to prevent other scientists from creating
human-animal chimeras for two decades, and to pressure policymakers
into at least developing a set of formal rules regarding the patenting of life
forms. 56
[22] Molecular biologists possess the ability to create animal-animal
chimeras. 57 A famous such example is the “geep,” an animal that was part
goat and part sheep, created by allowing a pair of sheep and a pair of goats
to mate naturally, and manipulating the embryos obtained; the two fused
embryos began to grow and divide as one embryo. 58 The Newman-Rifkin
http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2004/01/12_401.html; Schneider, supra note
51, at A1.
52
See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal.3d 120, 124-27 (Cal. 1990) (en
banc); see also Sharon Schmickle, Patents Stir Debate Over Rights to Life, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 3, 1998, at A7.
53
Dowie, supra note 52.
54
Under U.S. Patent Law, an invention does not have to be built, created (“actually
reduced to practice”); it is enough if the enabling disclosure allows one skilled in the art
to create the claimed invention (“constructive reduction to practice”). See USPTO,
Reduction to Practice,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2138_05.htm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2005).
55
See Rick Weiss, Patent Sought on Making of Part-Human Creatures, WASH. POST,
Apr. 2, 1998, at A12.
56
Id.
57
Magnani, supra note 35, at 445; see Dowie, supra note 52; Emma Young, Rare Clone
Dies, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 12, 2001, at 4-5 (discussing the cloning of an ox using a cow
egg).
58
Magnani, supra note 35, at 445-46; see Fehilly et al., supra note 30; MeineckeTillmann, supra note 29.
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patent application 59 contained three procedures for producing humananimal chimeras, one of which is similar to the procedure used to create
the “geep.” 60 Arguably, a human-animal chimaeric creature could be
created through combining a human embryo with that of an animal closely
related to human beings, e.g., with a non-human primate. 61 The NewmanRifkin patent application cited the possibility of chimeras made from
mice, chimpanzees, baboons, and pigs. 62
[23] The Newman-Rifkin application succeeded both in stirring up a
lively public debate on patentability of life forms, and in prompting a
policy response from the PTO. 63 Presented with a serious legal and
political quandary, the PTO rejected the human-animal chimera patent
application in June of 1999, in part because the invention “embraces” a
human being and is, therefore, unpatentable on the longstanding policy of
the PTO that human beings are not patentable. 64 However, the PTO did
not specify in the holding why animals containing human genetic material
do not embrace a human being. 65 The holding that a being that is fifty
percent human is too human to be patentable appeared to be, in part, a
rejection of a patent based on (moral) utility grounds. 66

59

A significant amount of ink was spent discussing this patent application. See Weiss,
supra note 56, at A12; David Dickson, Legal Fight Looms Over Patent Bid on Humananimal Chimaeras, 392 NATURE 423, 423-24 (1998); “Morality” Aspect of Utility
Requirement Can Bar Patent for Part-Human Inventions, 55 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. 555 (1998); Patent Application is Disallowed as “Embracing” Human
Being, 58 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 203 (1999).
60
Magnani, supra note 35, at 446; see Dowie, supra note 51.
61
Magnani, supra note 35, at 446.
62
Id. at 446-47.
63
This provocative subject has received renewed interest in the popular press. See id.
64
Rick Weiss, U.S. Ruling Aids Opponent of Patents for Life Forms, WASH. POST, June
17, 1999, at A2 (quoting the PTO ruling).
65
Id.
66
For a discussion on the morality component of the utility requirement for patentability,
see generally Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). More
recently, the PTO has contemplated using a morality interpretation of the utility
requirement in order to justify its rejection of patent applications for human-animal
chimeras. See “Morality” Aspect of Utility Requirement Can Bar Patent for Part-Human
Inventions, 55 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 555, 556 (1998); see also U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a Relationship to Humans,
Apr. 1, 1998, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm.
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[24] While the Chakrabarty court determined the patentability of bacteria,
nothing in its opinion indicated that human-based inventions are to be
excluded from patent protection. 67 Thus, the PTO could use no precedent,
and wrongly responded to the Newman-Rifkin application with dicta from
an outdated common-law case. 68 The PTO’s glib announcement that
inventions involving humans do not meet the standards for patentability
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was not supported by the Patent Act; it was simply
a unilateral reinterpretation of the law.
[25] The denial of the Newman-Rifkin patent application arrived with a
final Office action in August of 2004, rejecting all the claims. 69 From the
applicants’ point of view, perhaps the most victorious aspect of the Office
action was the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as non-statutory subject
matter. 70 The PTO disagreed with the applicants’ position that humans
are patentable subject matter. 71 The PTO examiner pointed out that,
although § 101 does not explicitly restrict the patentability of humans, the
PTO believes that its policy of denying such patents is supported by the
statute. 72 It should be noted that this PTO’s decision does not create a
legal precedent; courts have not yet decided the issue of patentability of
human-animal chimeras.
[26] Because mammal-mammal chimeras have already been produced, it
is questionable whether the creation of a human-animal chimera will be
considered novel or nonobvious over the prior art. 73 If a Minotaur is
successfully created, a legal void will be opened. 74 Patent claims could be
67

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).
69
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Final Rejection (Aug. 2, 2004),
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_CH/.cmd/ad/.ar/sa.getBib/.c/6
_0_69/.ce/7_0_1ET/.p/5_0_18L/.d/1?selectedTab=ifwtab&isSubmitted=isSubmitted&do
snum=08993564#7_0_1ET (enter application number 08/993,564 and click “submit,”
then click on “Final Rejection” in the resulting document list).
70
Id. at 19-22.
71
Id. at 20.
72
See id. at 21.
73
This article assumes that the patent application on the Minotaur is technically sound
and will satisfy the novelty and nonobviousness requirements for patentability of sections
101, and 102, and 103 of the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
74
The issue of human cloning in order to help infertile couples has already garnered
much public reaction. The White House has suggested that an outright ban could be
68
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filed both for the product (Minotaur), and for the process of producing a
chimaeric creature. The Minotaur could be deemed a person with full
legal rights akin to a naturally born individual. Alternatively, the
Minotaur could be viewed as fully proprietary in that its existence would
be subject to its creator’s wishes along the same lines as transgenic
animals. Finally, the creator could possess a proprietary interest in the
process of creation itself, but would not possess a right in the Minotaur.
These options are not mutually exclusive, and the result would be
influenced by a statutory regime dealing with the Minotaur’s offspring. 75
[27] It is easier to envisage obtaining a patent on the method (rather than
the product) of creating a Minotaur. Indeed, the PTO has already allowed
patentability of a process claim that might arguably be interpreted as
covering a method for the creation of human-animal chimeras. In 2001,
the University of Missouri received a patent on a technique for cloning
mammals and subsequently licensed the patent to the xenotransplantation
company Biotransplant. 76 Even though the ‘429 patent specifically
instituted. However, this is counterproductive to a proper regulatory regime because
industry will simply move elsewhere, unless a global ban on human cloning is instituted.
See Lisa Krieger, Ethicists Disagree on Cloning Regulations, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 9,
1998, at 8A.
75
Significant legal scholarship on this question exists. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss &
Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313 (1992).
76
Complete Oocyte Activation Using an Oocyte-Modifying Agent and a Reducing
Agent, U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 (filed June 18, 1998) (issued April 3, 2001).
A method for producing a cloned mammal, comprising: (a) isolating a
membrane-bounded nucleus from a cell of said mammal; (b) removing
the nuclear chromosomal material from an unfertilized recipient
mammalian oocyte, thereby preparing an enucleated recipient
mammalian oocyte; (c) introducing said membrane-bounded nucleus
from said cell of said mammal into said enucleated recipient
mammalian oocyte to form an oocyte containing said nucleus from said
cell of said mammal; (d) reprogramming the developmental cascade of
events of said nucleus from said cell of said mammal; (e) incubating
said oocyte containing within its cytoplasm said nucleus of said cell
from said mammal with an oocyte-modifying agent followed by a
reducing agent, wherein said oocyte is incubating with said oocytemodifying agent and said reducing agent, respectively, for a time and
under conditions such that said oocyte is activated; (f) culturing said
activated oocyte of step (e) in vitro or in vivo; and (g) transferring said
cultured, activated oocyte of step (f) to the oviduct or uterus of a
recipient maternal mammal to produce a cloned mammal.
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mentions human eggs, the patent lacks the standard “nonhuman”
disclaimer that had previously been required for approval under the
Manual of Patent Examination Procedure. 77 True, the patent is for a
process and not for a product. However, the disclosure also encompasses
“the living, cloned products produced by each of the methods described,”
which theoretically includes human and chimeric embryos and
organisms. 78
[28] A similar development has occurred in the European Union. In the
1990s, the European Patent Office granted a patent to the company Amrad
for the “use of leukemia inhibitory factor (LIF) in the maintenance and
derivation of embryonic stem (ES) cells in culture.” 79 The patent method
“extends to the generation and maintenance of ES cells from humans,
mice, birds (e.g. chickens), sheep, pigs, cattle, goats and fish and to the
generation of transgenic chimaeric animals and their transgenic
progeny.” 80 European Patent Convention (EPC) law stipulates that the
process of creating a being also includes the being itself. That is indicated
in EPC Article 64(2): “If the subject-matter of the European patent is a
process, the protection conferred by the patent shall extend to the products
directly obtained by such process.” 81 Arguably, the patented method could
provide patent protection over the creation of a Minotaur.
[29] To complete this Patent Law primer, it should be noted that a patent
right is exclusionary. Obtaining a patent merely gives the patent owner
the right to exclude others from practicing the patented invention; it does
not give the patent owner any affirmative right to practice the patented
invention. Thus, obtaining a patent on the process for patenting a
Minotaur does not necessarily allow one to practice the method.
[30] The PTO’s stance that patent claims including a human being will
not be considered has not definitively settled the question of patents on
Id. at claim 20.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
See E.U. Patent No. HK1003208 (filed Aug. 3, 1989) (issued May 31, 1990), available
at http://v3.espacenet.com/textdoc?DB=EPODOC&IDX=HK1003208&F=0.
80
Id.
81
Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 64, Oct. 5, 1973, available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar64.html.
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human organisms. 82 Because “cloned human embryos are not persons
protected by the Constitution and theoretically at least could be as
‘immortal’ as cloned cell lines,” perhaps a particularly “novel” and
“useful” human embryo could be patented. 83 Patents on animals
containing spliced human genes are permitted. These creatures often
express human characteristics, such as human hormones or other
chemicals that the animal would not produce in nature. In some sense, a
transgenic mammal containing and expressing human genes is a
chimera. 84 Why then all the fuss about patentability of human-animal
hybrids?
[31] Patenting of a Minotaur could be possible under the rubric of
“biological material,” since a multitude of patents on biological material
have been allowed. Alternatively, a Minotaur could be patented as a
product-by-process. Section 103(b) of the Patent Act provides that the
products of biotechnological processes fall within the scope of the patent
on the process. 85 The Minotaur could fall within the scope of a patent on
the process from which it is derived. In light of recent precedents, one is
hard pressed to come up with a reason for the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit or for the Supreme Court to deny a patent to a humananimal chimera.
[32] Congress, PTO, and the federal courts probably did not anticipate the
creation of human-animal chimeras. Nevertheless, now that the creation
of chimeras has become a possibility, there is a need to determine whether
there is any current justification for excluding human or part human
inventions. If there is no justification, then chimeras should be patentable.
If there is, then where is the line drawn to satisfy the patentability
requirements, to avoid the patent application being stricken on the ground
of the organism being too human? To maintain a legitimate and efficient
system of patents on life forms, a new analytical paradigm must replace
the current amorphous regime. This new system should be flexible and
adaptable to technological innovations; it could utilize a set of quantifiable
82

See Fishman, supra note 8, at 473.
George J. Annas, Of Monkeys, Man, and Oysters, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Aug./Sept. 1987, at 20, 22.
84
See Fishman, supra note 8, at 480-81.
85
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
83
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scientific standards to establish a limit on the extent to which researchers
could harness the power of biotechnology, while still allowing for
patentability of transgenic organisms that contain human DNA.
[33] The PTO’s policy of granting patents on human tissues and on
genetically-engineered animals, some of which contain human genes,
while abstaining from granting patents on humans outright, has left the
question of the patentability of human-animal chimeras unanswered. In
absence of statutory authority on point, the answer to this question
depends largely on standards that will be adopted by the court to
determine humanity under the Thirteenth Amendment. 86 Such standards
may have implications in other high-technology industries. 87
[34] Currently, no case law discusses precisely how much human
biological material a creature must possess before it qualifies as human. 88
Both qualitative and quantitative models for defining “humanness” have
been suggested. 89 Complexity exists as to what type of biological material
should be used as a criterion for determination of the human character of
an organism – should it be quantities of DNA, proteins, metabolites,
number of cells, tissues, organs, etc. Transplant patients who receive
animal organs are still considered human. 90 On the other hand, transgenic
animals that possess human genes have been patented. 91 Possessing one
or even a few human genes does not make an animal human. 92
Chimpanzees share far more than 50% genetic homology with humans. 93
86

Magnani, supra note 35, at 449.
Id. at 449 n.52. Remarkably, under an overly broad interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment, androids, cyborgs, and similar part-human, part-robotic entities might be
considered human.
88
Id., at 449.
89
Sina A. Muscati, “Some More Human Than Others:” Assessing the Scope of
Patentability Related to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 201,
216 (2004) (suggesting establishment of a threshold of, e.g., 50% of human genes as a
criterion for “humanness”).
90
Magnani, supra note 35, at 449.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 449.
93
The similarity between human and chimpanzee DNA is estimated to be 95% or greater.
Roy J. Britten, Divergence Between Samples of Chimpanzee and Human DNA Sequences
Is 5%, Counting Indels, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13633, 13633 (2002), available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/vol99/issue21. This fact begs the interesting questions –
87
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Consequently, one cannot simply use a rule that says that any organism
composed of over 50% human genetic material would be considered
human. 94 Chimeras consisting of less than fifty percent human genetic
material may be considered human. 95 The appropriate standard applied
might be whether the Minotaur would consider itself to be human. 96 If the
Minotaur possessed self-awareness, the PTO could find it to be human
(enough) under the Thirteenth Amendment. 97
[35] At most, “the Thirteenth Amendment is an unwieldy tool for
regulating biotechnology inventions like the human-animal chimera.” 98
Thirteenth Amendment concerns over slavery are not applicable to the
discussion over patenting a Minotaur. 99 The concerns reflect opinions that
were voiced in the early stage of patenting human DNA in the late 1980s.
Since then, numerous patents on human genes have been awarded. While
one might accept that the Thirteenth Amendment could apply to
biotechnology products, it does not restrict process claims in a patent
application embodying a human-animal chimera. 100 In its initial reaction,
the PTO interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as a subject matter
limitation. 101 However, “the Thirteenth Amendment cannot effectively
and consistently be applied even to biotechnology product claims until the
courts adopt a workable definition of ‘human being.’” 102 It is unlikely that
how will a chimpanzee-human hybrid be classified, and what would we call a transgenic
chimpanzee that contains the 5% of complemented human genome?
94
See Magnani, supra note 35, at 449-450. Use of this type of standard has been
defended by its simplicity, with analogy to the burden of proof in civil cases. To deny a
particular patent, the government’s burden would be to show that the invention in
question is “more human than not.” Id., at 450 n.54. Such a standard is perhaps artificial
and over simplistic. Id. at 450.
95
Id. at 450.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
See id. at 449-50.
100
Id. at 450. A product patent claims a structural entity (e.g., a chimera), whereas a
process patent claims an operation or series of steps leading to a useful result. 1-1
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §1.03 (2004).
101
Magnani, supra note 35, at 449. The PTO does not generally employ this kind of
limitation to deny a patent on a process that produces an unpatentable product. See
Eileen Morin, Of Mice and Men: The Ethics of Patenting Animals, 5 HEALTH L.J. 147,
154 (1997).
102
Magnani, supra note 35, at 450.
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it could be used to reject patent applications for human-animal chimeras or
applications for other products of biotechnology that are not entirely
human in nature. 103
ETHICAL CONCERNS OVER PATENTING A MINOTAUR
[36] Advances in transgenic animal research have spurred increasing fear
and controversy over the genetic engineering possibilities of such
research. As a result, groups opposed to transgenic animal research seek
to impede its progress by attacking the patentability of transgenic animals.
Through these efforts, opponents seek to eliminate a perceived incentive
for the production of chimeras - economic gain. 104 The concerns raised by
these groups may be consolidated into three major areas: economic,
environmental, and other ethical. 105
[37] Various ethical concerns related to patenting of life forms have been
expressed in literature. They touch on subjects as divergent as animal
welfare, protection of the environment, and other moral concerns.
Frequently, these issues are interrelated, which further complicates the
analyses. Sometimes the criticism is generally directed toward granting
patent rights in general, based on the argument that patents unjustifiably
restrict the liberty of others. 106 In other instances, the grants of patents on
life forms are more specifically attacked.
[38] Moral acceptability is an exceedingly complex standard to
implement as a criterion of patentability. Moral norms (d)evolve and can
change over the course of only a few years. 107 The PTO is not
institutionally equipped to make moral judgments.108 Admittedly, a moral
103

Id.
See generally Sellers, supra note 14.
105
Id.
106
See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 821 (1990).
107
Note that in the field of patent law, the technical expertise and skills of “one of
ordinary skill in the art” can also change in the course of a brief amount of time. 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). Such a fluid definition, based on standard rather than rules, can
accommodate the constant technological advances.
108
Merges, supra note 18, at 1062; see 1 DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 4.03 (2003) (providing a
104
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utility doctrine played a part in the early development of United States
patent law. The history of the morality component of the utility
requirement can be traced to the 1817 case of Lowell v. Lewis, and is
attributed to Justice Joseph Story. 109 Following the Lowell decision,
courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generally struck
down patents on the basis of immorality for inventions used to defraud
buyers. 110 Courts also denied patents for items used in gambling or
similarly “immoral” activity. 111 Since the middle of the last century, that
trend has been reversed, and federal courts have stopped applying the
moral utility doctrine to reject patent applications.
[39] Compelled to comment on the human-based Newman-Rifkin patent
application, in 1998 the PTO issued a media advisory, stating that “[i]t is
the position of the PTO that inventions directed to human/non-human
chimera could, under certain circumstances, not be patentable because,
among other things, they would fail to meet the public policy and morality
aspects of the utility requirement.” 112 With that statement, the PTO
shifted the focus of its stance away from a constitutional basis and toward
an expansion of its statutory reading, while citing dicta from the Lowell
decision. 113

review of relevant case law); Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues
Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 247 (2000).
109
Lowell v. Lewis,15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). In a frequently quoted
passage, Justice Story concluded “all that the law requires is, that the invention should
not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.
The word ‘useful,’ therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to
mischievous or immoral.” Id. at 1019. As examples of immoral inventions, Story cited
“a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private
assassination.” Id.
110
Merges, supra note 18, at 1062; Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 868, 873 (2d Cir.
1900). A process for artificially producing spots on tobacco leaves used to wrap cigars,
such that leaves resembled those used to wrap high-quality cigars, was unpatentable for
lack of utility. Id. at 869, 873.
111
Merges, supra note 18, at 1062; Brett G. Alten, Note, Left to One’s Devices: Congress
Limits Patents on Medical Procedures, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
837, 845-46 (1998); Magnani, supra note 36, at 451.
112
Richard J. Basile et al., Patent and Trademark Office Issues Statement on Patenting of
Partial Human Life Forms, 10 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 17, 17 (1998).
113
Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
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[40] The PTO also cited the 1991 Tol-O-Matic decision, in which the
Federal Circuit upheld a patent on a rodless piston-cylinder, noting that 35
U.S.C. § 101 “has [] been interpreted to exclude inventions deemed to be
immoral.” 114 That the Federal Circuit invoked such a controversial
doctrine in a setting where the morality argument was not even raised
might have implied that the court was preparing to invoke the doctrine
with greater frequency in the future. 115 Such concerns were dispelled in
1999, when the Federal Circuit held that the moral utility doctrine has not
been broadly applied by courts in recent years and upheld a patent even
though the invention was designed to deceive customers by imitating
another product. 116
[41] Elsewhere, the European Union has used a form of the moral utility
doctrine as a means of rejecting immoral or destructive patents. 117 The
European Patent Office (EPO) has applied two morality criteria. One test
espouses a “public abhorrence” standard, which denies a patent to any
invention where public consensus determines that such a grant would be
abhorrent. 118 The other test utilizes an “unacceptability” criterion, which
denies a patent where the disadvantages of the patent to society would
outweigh the advantages. 119 The “unacceptability” test is more stringent,
since an invention that is not “abhorrent” may still be deemed so
“unacceptable” as to preclude patent protection. Thus, variation in which
of the two tests is applied results in inconsistent standards of patentability.
114

Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546,
1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
115
Magnani, supra note 35, at 453.
116
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1365-68 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
117
Council Directive 98/44, art. 6, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 16 (EC), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_213/l_21319980730en00130021.pdf.
118
It seems that the public consensus test is not the easiest one to apply, because it has a
very high standard to meet, if the word “consensus” is taken seriously. See application of
the “public abhorrence” and “unacceptability” tests in Greenpeace Ltd. v. Plant Genetic
Systems N.V., T 356/93 - 3.3.4, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545 (Technical Bd. of App.).
Greenpeace contended that the patent violated the Article 53(a) morality provision of the
EPC. Id.
119
But see Leland Stanford/Modified Animal, Application No. 88,312,222.8, 2002
E.P.O.R. 2, (Opp. Div. 2001) (rejecting a public ordre-morality opposition to a patent for
an immunocompromised mouse implanted with human hematopoietic tissue, .i.e.,
“animal-human chimera,” on the ground that it would be presumptuous for the EPO to
interfere in an unresolved public debate on the patenting of xenotransplantation
technology by acting as moral censor and invoking the provisions of EPC art. 53(a)).
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[42] The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPs) has placed emphasis on morality. 120 Under TRIPs article 27(2),
states may exclude an invention from patentability on the basis of ordre
public where granting a patent would result in commercial exploitation of
the invention. 121 Proponents of adding a morality test for patentability
could argue that it comports United States law with an international
treaty. 122
[43] Proponents of the morality test argue that treating genetically altered
organisms and genes as patentable inventions institutionalizes disrespect
for life. They claim that all organisms possess morally considerable
interests and are not tools or instruments that people are entitled to own
through patents. 123 In their view, a patent is a legal and moral category
that was developed for newly created inanimate devices.124
[44] Society’s moral norms, as well as the courts’ perceptions of those
norms, have evolved and relaxed over time. Patents have been issued for
inventions that might be considered immoral by some subcultures. These
include guns, slot machines, cattle prods, and abortion-related
instruments. 125 I do not advocate here that it is acceptable to uphold
patents on subjects considered immoral – I attempt to illustrate the
changes in patentability as a function of societal moral norms. As the law
has undergone modifications, so have the skills of ordinary practitioners of
120

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 81.
121
Id. (stating that a patent may be withheld in order to protect ordre public (law and
order)).
122
Id. In other words, with a morality tests, the PTO and U.S. courts would not be
violating art. 27(2) of the TRIPs Agreement.
123
Ned Hettinger, Patenting Life: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and
Environmental Ethics, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 267, 284 (1995).
124
Id. at 284. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (stating that patentable subject matter is “any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”); see also
LEON KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 14344 (1985).
125
See Merges, supra note 18, at 1062-67 (discussing the history of patenting of
“immoral” inventions). Merges argues that in determining “utility” the courts “should
apply a test which will not penalize an inventor who may be prescient enough to be
anticipating basic needs of a society changed by forces yet unrecognized by the general
public.” Id. at 1065.
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the legal art changed over time. Created in relatively broad strokes, the
patent law is designed to largely adapt to the inevitable technological
changes. There is no compelling reason why the law cannot adapt to
moral changes as well.
CONCERNS OVER “HUMANNESS” OF THE MINOTAUR
[45] The traits that define humanity have been debated by philosophers
since the humans first differentiated themselves from other animals. Some
use both psychological and social criteria of personhood to argue that selfawareness is what distinguishes humans from other animals. 126 However,
a fundamental division of opinion exists between those who see human
life in terms of its intrinsic value or in terms of its utilitarian value. The
divergent perspectives combine both philosophical and economic
considerations. The perspectives range from essentialist with a penchant
for the welfare state to utilitarian with a neoliberal accent with a myriad of
approaches in between these two. 127
[46] The paramount significance is in the standard that will be employed
for patentability of the Minotaur. If the Minotaur is considered human, an
argument must be identified to justify a no-patenting rule; otherwise, a
patent to the Minotaur would need to be granted. Issues related to
patenting humans and human material already abound. For instance,
having the capability of creating human embryos in vitro, we face a
decision of whether to allow their patenting. To decide that, first we need
to define the legal status of embryos. Courts have spoken on that
question. In Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that
“preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but
occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of
their potential for human life.” 128 Similarly, embryos are “not entitled to
the protections granted to persons,” nor should they be given special
treatment based on their potential of human life. 129 One court recently
126

Michael D. Rivard, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A
Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1425, 1487 (1992).
127
David P. Fidler, Introduction to Written Symposium on Public Health and
International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2002).
128
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
129
Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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indicated that the common law should recognize that a stillborn fetus,
“while not a person, [i]s not ‘property’ or ‘tissue’ . . . [but] an intermediate
category in the law entitled to a special respect that would not be given
ordinary tissue.” 130 Scholars argue that embryos cannot be considered
humans because they lack sentience and awareness. 131 To regulate the
controversy over patents on human embryos Congress should pass a law
that would adopt standards to distinguish between what organisms are not
patentable (e.g., humans, some human-animal chimeras) and what
biological material is patentable. 132
[47] A distinctive genetic signature does not necessarily “compel the
conclusion that an embryo is a legal individual.” 133 Many organisms
“display unique genetic signatures, but there . . . [is] no societal consensus
that this accords them individual rights under the law.” 134 It is possible
that allowing patents on humans may come in direct conflict with the right
of reproductive freedom granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.135
“However, because the offspring of a patented person would be different
from the person, it is unlikely that [such a] patent [would interfere] with
the right to reproduce,” 136 unless reproduction constitutes unlicensed use
of the parent’s patented genome. 137
[48] If the Minotaur is not human enough to be classified as human, is it
animal enough to be considered an animal? If the answer is yes, then
130

Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 971 (Conn. 1999).
See John A. Robertson, Genetic Alteration of Embryos: The Ethical Issues, in
GENETICS AND THE LAW III 115, 120-21 (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds.
1984) (arguing that gene therapy on embryos is ethical).
132
But see Sellers, supra note 14, at 290-91. Sellers argues that it is “unlikely that
legislative or judicial line-drawing on (animal patenting) will substantially affect a
particular person's beliefs.” Id.
133
Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30
HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1654 (1993).
134
Id.
135
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Burk, supra note 133, at 1649.
136
John Miller, A Call to Legal Arms: Bringing Embryonic Stem Cell Therapies to
Market, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 555, 580 n.147 (2003); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1 (protecting liberty interests by the Due Process Clause).
137
Because the offspring would not contain the patented genome, it (s/he) would not fall
under the patent law prohibition against making. However, the parent might be able to
argue unlawful use of patented genome.
131
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issues related to animal welfare need to be considered. Scholars have
supported protection of animal rights by taking a position known as
“sentientism,” the view that all sentient beings possess morally
considerable interests. 138 Sentientism’s view is that all beings who can
feel pleasure and pain possess individual welfares served by their physical
features. 139 Thus, animals are not mere resources to which people may be
naturally entitled.
[49] In defense of anthropocentrism is the reality that owning animals has
been a legitimate human tradition for millennia. Animals are valued in the
marketplace on the basis of their rarity and utility; they are eaten and used
for biomedical research. Consequently, patenting animals “seems
relatively benign.” 140
[50] Some commentators have come up with a Solomonic solution in
accepting the biocentric ethic. Rejecting biocentric egalitarianism, they
accept that all organisms are morally considerable, albeit not to the same
degree. 141 These authors allow that individual organisms have different
degrees of moral significance, and believe animal patents to be more
problematic than plant or microbe patents. 142
[51] Critics of biocentric ethics hold that the fact that organisms possess
goods of their own does not mandate that people cannot be morally
indifferent to them, nor that we have prima facie duties to respect

138

Ned Hettinger, supra note 123, at 285.
This argument is developed through a defense of the environmental ethic known as
“biocentrism.” The doctrine holds that all living beings possess morally-considerable
interests that should be respected. Ned Hettinger, supra note 123, at 284-85.
140
Lisa J. Raines, The Mouse That Roared, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer 1988, at 64,
68.
141
See Ned Hettinger, supra note 123, at 285; Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights,
in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 13, 23 (Peter Singer ed., 1985) (defending the so-called
“reverence for life”). For a general discussion of the biocentric ideal of respect for all
life, see generally ALBERT SCHWEITZER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVILIZATION 240-64 (Am.
ed. 1950).
142
Ned Hettinger, supra note 123, at 285. Biocentric egalitarianism argues that all living
beings are equally morally important. See PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 14-25 (1986); Kenneth E. Goodpaster, On Being
Morally Considerable, 75 J. PHIL. 308, 308-25 (1978).
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organisms’ welfare. 143 Owning animals certainly does not negate the
claim that animals may have a good of their own or that animal welfare
may be a coherent concept. On the other hand, being owned and taken
care of by humans may sometimes be consistent with animals’ best
interests.
[52] Environmental concerns have been raised in the context of patenting
life forms. For example, Greenpeace challenged the 1990 grant of a patent
to Plant Genetic Systems N.V. for a method of developing plants and
seeds resistant to a particular class of herbicides (production of transgenic
plants). 144
[53] The subject of patenting life forms has become fertile ground for
interest groups to start a debate on topics far beyond patenting of life
forms. The variety of ethical points raised represent proxies for a universe
of moral standings, fears, harms, benefits, and religious and economic
interests. Unfortunately, these arguments put an unjustified burden on
patent law, asking it to solve socio-economic and philosophical questions.
Patent law is ill equipped for such a task.
PROPERTY PROBLEMS RELATED TO CREATION OF A MINOTAUR
[54] The labor theory of property acquisition is frequently used in favor
of property rights in general. 145 According to this theory, laborers are
naturally entitled to the fruits of their labor. 146 The Lockean argument can
be intuitively summarized: I made it and hence it is mine; it would not
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See John O’Neill, The Varieties of Intrinsic Value, 75 MONIST 119, 131-32 (1992).
Greenpeace Ltd. v. Plant Genetic Systems N.V., Case T-356/93 - 3.3.4, 1995 O.J.
E.P.O. 545 (Technical Bd. of App.). Greenpeace maintained that patenting of plant
material could have disastrous environmental effects. Greenpeace asserted that the
invention posed several environmental risks: (1) the plants could themselves become
weeds or pests and pass their genes on to other plants which, in turn, might become
herbicide-resistant; (2) the release of the plants could disrupt the ecostructure and lead to
a reduction in biodiversity; and (3) the patent could increase the use of herbicides, and
lead to the creation of more genetically engineered plants. Id.
145
See Richard T. Jackson, A Lockean Approach to the Compulsory Patent Licensing
Controversy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 117, 124 (2004).
146
See id. at 124-25.
144
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exist but for me. 147 This property argument has been utilized to defend
patents on transgenic animals. 148
[55] Another argument for property rights in patenting life forms comes
from the consequentialist-incentive rationale. The argument asserts that
grants of patents on life forms “are necessary incentives for the production
of socially optimal levels of biological innovation,” resulting in improved
food, drugs, etcetera. “Without the patent incentive, such innovation
would drastically slow.” 149
[56] A desert rationale for property rights should be considered as well.
According to this theory, laborers deserve to benefit from their labors, at
least when their efforts aim to produce something socially useful. 150
Researchers invest time, energy, and resources into their labor. They
ought to have something in return for the biotechnological products they
generate. 151 Accordingly, patenting a Minotaur may be justified as just
deserts for the researchers’ labor. 152
[57] Opponents of patenting life forms contend biotechnological advances
should be shared for the benefit of all humankind. The common heritage
argument is that “living matter…is part of the ‘heritage of Humanity and
Nature in general’ and should not be classified as ‘private property’
through the granting of patents.” 153
[58] Invoking Kantian moral philosophy, some have criticized the award
of property rights in bodily parts. These arguments are based on human
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See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14-26 (J.W. Gough ed.,
1946).
148
See generally Paul B. Thompson, Concepts of Property and the Biotechnology Debate
(Sept. 1992), http://nabc.cals.cornell.edu/pubs/occ_paper_1/Thompson.html.
149
Ned Hettinger, supra note 123, at 291-92.
150
See generally GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987) (analyzing philosophically what people
deserve).
151
Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 40-43
(1989).
152
See id.
153
Darrell G. Dotson, The European Controversy Over Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 919, 944 (1997) (quoting EP Greens Launch a Campaign Against the
Draft EEC Directive on Patenting Biotechnological Inventions, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 1992).
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freedom, dignity, and self-respect. 154 In this view human freedom is
postulated on the premise that human beings have free will, and that
human dignity is priceless. If humans had property rights in their own
bodies and exercised those rights by sale or licensing, they would treat
their genetic material in ways conflicting with humanity and dignity.
Persons would decline to the level of things with a price. 155 An extension
of this view is the creation of a distinction between personal rights and
property rights in regard to human bodies. 156 However, twenty-first
century reality defeats Kant’s philosophical arguments. Kant could not
have foreseen the existence of markets for human gametes and organs;
otherwise, he might have revised his position on human freedom and
human dignity.
[59] Supporters of animal patents point out that humans have treated
animals as property for thousands of years by buying them, selling them,
breeding them, and keeping them as pets. Academic researchers
developed the Harvard oncomouse; eventually, it became the property of
the Du Pont pharmaceutical company. 157 One can acquire property rights
in wild animals by taking exclusive possession. 158 Some have argued
issuing patents for life forms would not change the nature of this normal
commerce; it would simply ensure that inventors receive the profits
resulting from their efforts. 159 We do not make sociological distinctions
between owning patented animals and unpatented animals. 160
154

Stephen R. Munzer, Kant and Property Rights in Body Parts, 6 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 319, 326-330 (1993).
155
See IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 121-25 (Louis Infield trans., Harper and
Row 1963) (1930) (emphasizing that persons are neither property nor things and may not
sell parts of their bodies; also arguing that humanity is degraded when individuals sell
themselves for the sexual pleasure of others).
156
See Stephen R. Munzer, The Special Case of Property Rights in Umbilical Cord Blood
for Transplantation, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 493, 497-98 (1999). See generally STEPHEN R.
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990) (offering a multi-principled theory for
justifying property rights).
157
Alun Anderson, Oncomouse Released, 336 NATURE 300 (1988).
158
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
159
Mark W. Lauroesch, Genetic Engineering: Innovation and Risk Minimization, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 100, 114-15 (1988) (stressing that it would be inconsistent to deny
intellectual property rights over transgenic animals when personal property rights have
historically been recognized in naturally occurring animals); see Dresser, supra note 7, at
413 (declaring that humans have long “objectified” animals).
160
Raines, supra note 140, at 68.

29

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XII, Issue 2

[60] Fascinating conflicts of rights would be created if the Minotaur was
patentable. If a chimera was capable of reproduction (as the mythological
chimera was), a conundrum would arise over the question whether of the
patent would be infringed by the chimera’s natural offspring, and whether
the patent holder is entitled to injunctional remedy. In addition, we can
only surmise the social and symbolic ramifications of being a patented
sentient entity.
METAPHYSICAL CONCERNS
[61] The delicate balance between the advancement of science and the
maintenance of fundamental religious beliefs is disturbed by achievements
in the area of genetic engineering. 161 Biotechnology brings into focus the
sensitive issues of creation and evolution. Science has placed us on the
threshold of discovering procedures which will allow the manipulation of
processes that until now have only been known to nature or God
(depending on the side taken). The gap that exists between that which can
be explained by analytical science and that which is answerable through
religious doctrines is shrinking in the favor of science. Nevertheless, for
science to achieve beneficial results for all of humanity, religion must
have its place in the debate. “The moral and spiritual ideals represented
by religion must not be discarded for the sake of scientific progress.” 162
Indeed, the more sophisticated proponents of religion have attempted to
blend science with religion.
[62] In the new world of genetic engineering, religion’s role in society
must be reevaluated in order to help define the most beneficial route to
improving life through technology. Fundamental religious teachings on
the God-like ability to create life are being tested by potential
achievements in genetic engineering. Differing views among the many
religions complicate the religiously permissive genetic research. God’s
position differs, depending on which God one invokes. For example, the
Vatican, in condemning attempts to clone humans, warned that because
only God can create the spiritual soul, resulting clones would be
161

See Dorothy Nelkin, Genetics, God, and Sacred DNA, 33 SOC’Y 22, 22-25 (1996).
Jason T. Corsover, Article, The Logical Next Step? An International Perspective on
the Issues of Human Cloning and Genetic Technology, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 697,
750 (1998).
162
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psychically damaged. 163 Such a proposition is very intriguing; by
extension of the Vatican’s logic, God probably has not created souls for all
of the IVF (In Vitro Fertilized) children. On the other hand, the spiritual
guide for the Moslem Hezbollah, Sheikh Mohammed Hussein, claimed
that because God has allowed science to progress, research into cloning
should continue. 164 “Jewish law (halakhah) places supreme importance
on…the preservation of human life – which overrides all other
commandments in the Torah except for murder, idolatry, or adultery.” 165
Genetic engineering of animals and plants with the goal of saving or
prolonging human life would be permitted, if not required, by halakhah.
[63] Various religious groups claim that genetic engineering amounts to a
form of playing God. 166 They argue that “[r]everence for all life created
by God [is] eroded by . . . economic pressures to view animal life as if it
were an industrial product invented and manufactured by humans.” 167
The concern is that patenting life forms renders animals marketable
commodities and that using animals as a means to an end degrades the
sanctity of life. Moreover, “the classification of an animal as a
‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ invented by humans demeans
the reverence of God.” 168 Commenting on the PTO policy after the PTO
lifted an apparently self-imposed moratorium on animal patents in 1992,
163

See Pontificia Academia Pro Vita, Reflections on Cloning,
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/rc_pa_acdlif
e_doc_30091997_clon_en.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
164
See Hezbollah Mentor Says “God Allowed” Cloning, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
Mar. 13, 1997.
165
Jewish Center for Public Affairs, Jewish Perspectives on Genetic Engineering (Oct.
2001), http://www.jcpa.org/art/jep2.htm.
166
See, e.g., National Information Resource on Ethics and Human Genetics, Splicing
Life: A Report on the Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human
Beings (Nov. 1982),
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past_commissions/splicinglife.pdf#search='Splicing%2
0Life'.
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Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 399 (1987) (statement of Rev. Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, National Council of
the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.).
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Morin, supra note 101, at 169. The real crux of the objection is perhaps the oft-cited
Chakrabarty phrase that allows patentability of “anything under the sun that is made by
man.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). That phrase may be
interpreted as a direct challenge to God the Creator.
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Dr. Richard D. Land, executive director of the Christian Life Commission
of the Southern Baptist Convention, stated, “We belong to the creator
God. The PTO’s decision to grant patents on animal or human genetic
information represents a usurpation of the ownership rights of the
Sovereign of the universe.” 169
[64] Humans alter the course of nature in ways other than through
biotechnology. We have changed nature through irrigation of arid
farmland, drilling for oil, selective breeding of plants and animals, birth
controls, the use of medicine and technology to extend life, and through
conservation of endangered species. Interestingly enough, these human
interventions are not the object of criticism; genetic engineering is singled
out. 170 In fact, religious tenets could also be used to support the position
that humans have a duty to employ their God-given powers to harness
nature for human benefit. “While there may be [religious] arguments
against genetic engineering when it has detrimental consequences, an
objection based solely on the alteration of nature is unfounded.” 171 The
moral dilemma arising from genetic engineering is not its actual existence,
but whether the technology is applied responsibly. 172
[65] Theologians have expressed their views on the potential to clone
humans and manipulate their genetic constitution. As a fundamental
belief, human life is sacred and liberty is a basic right granted to humans
out of respect for their autonomous and free nature. From there, differing
views are formed on how humans should handle the knowledge to
manipulate the creation and genetic development of their own species. 173
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Bruce Rubenstein, Genetic Patents Pits Clients, Religion, Government, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 1995, at 1.
170
See Heureka, Genetic Engineering: Paradise on Earth or Descent Into Hell? (Sept.
1999), http://www.heureka.clara.net/gaia/genetics.htm.
171
Morin, supra note 101, at 169-70.
172
Id. at 170.
173
See Ralph C. Conte, Toward a Theological Construct for the New Biology: An
Analysis of Rahner, Fletcher, and Ramsey, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 429, 442
(1995).
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[66] The most fundamental objection to biotechnology patents relates to
patenting life, and therefore the patent holders “own life.” 174 A problem
with that assertion is the difficulty in defining “life,” both in the biological
sciences, and as a legal term of art. 175 The word “life” is ordinarily used
as an abstraction from concrete living things. From the point of view of
patent law, patenting life seems to be a meaningless notion because the
law does not provide for patenting of abstractions. This unfortunately
does not prevent the use of “patenting life” objection as an effective
slogan to mislead people into thinking that a sinister move is made to
monopolize the essence of life. 176
BENEFITS FROM PATENTING THE MINOTAUR
[67] Transgenic animals and human-animal chimeras have the potential
for generating a multitude of societal benefits. These range from medical
uses, such as gene correction and organ transplants, to production of
specially tailored hybrid mammals for industrial applications. As sources
of donor organs, these creatures could potentially save many human
lives. 177 Non-sentient hybrid animals could be developed to industrialize
the drug testing process for pharmaceutical products. 178 One would
anticipate rapid progress in the development of new drugs with availability
of human-ape chimeras as the ultimate model for clinical studies. Such an
application could replace the current controversial use of sentient
174

See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY: HARNESSING THE GENE AND
REMAKING THE WORLD 37 (1998). Rifkin speculates that there is a real “possibility of
patenting all of the separate parts, if not the whole, of a human being.” See id. at 45.
175
Consider the impossibility of reaching consensus on the definition of “life” in the
abortion debate.
176
See VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 3-5
(1997) (suggesting that the cultural knowledge and biological diversity of non-Western
societies are being plundered by means of obtaining patents on “life-forms” and by
patenting their indigenous knowledge).
177
Magnani, supra note 36, at 456. Organs such as livers, kidneys, pancreas, and hearts,
may some day be developed in animals for transplant into humans. See generally
Rebecca D. Williams, Food and Drug Administration, Organ Transplants from Animals:
Examining the Possibilities (June 1996),
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/596_xeno.html.
178
See Magnani, supra note 35, at 456; Manspeizer, supra note 6, at 425 (suggesting that
transgenic animals may be used as “miniature drug factories”). That has since become
reality.
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laboratory animals, and neutralize the concerns of the animal rights
movement.
[68] Human-animal chimeras could be created as purely laboratory
organisms, to study genetic diseases and conduct “gene therapy” studies.
In conducting gene therapy medical studies, as in any area of
groundbreaking research, the promise of curing genetic diseases will have
high costs, sometimes lethal. 179 Arguably, it is more acceptable to create
new organisms for the purposes of testing novel, potentially lethal medical
approaches, rather than risk human lives. Chimeras for use in medical
experiments could be closely related to humans, yet rendered
“decerebrate” through genetic engineering. That way, the chimeras would
be physically incapable of experiencing pain. 180
[69] Another use of the Minotaur and like creatures could be as a
replacement for humans under conditions that are risky and dangerous.
Chimeras might be utilized for activities in unwelcoming environments
such as dangerous mines, proximity to radioactive sources, etc., where
humans would be exposed to grave risks.
[70] In addition to being useful in the study of diseases and potentially as
organ donors, human-animal chimeras can be designed to produce costeffective human proteins in large quantities, in a process known as
“genepharming.” 181 The chimeras could replace the transgenic animals
that are today designed to produce cost-effective pharmaceutical products
in large quantities. Proteins such as human hemoglobin, growth hormone
and insulin can be retrieved from secreted milk of transgenic animals. 182
[71] The establishment of unquestionable patent protection should
generate an incentive for invention of chimeras. The medical and other
179

A clinical gene therapy experiment at the University of Pennsylvania killed a teenage
volunteer. Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Methods Faulted in Fatal Gene Therapy,
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1999, at A1.
180
See generally BERNARD E. ROLLIN, THE FRANKENSTEIN SYNDROME: ETHICAL AND
SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE GENETIC ENGINEERING OF ANIMALS (Cambridge University Press
1995).
181
See Thomas T. Moga, Transgenic Animals As Intellectual Property (or the Patented
Mouse That Roared), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 511, 531-32 (1994).
182
Id.
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benefits could help counterbalance the moral core of the religious
opponents and of the animal rights movement.
CONCLUSION
[72] Panta rei. This Article continues the debate on attempts to add
legitimacy to the issuance of patents on life forms. The core of the
controversy is conflicting social policies which utilize the patent system as
its vehicle of expression. Patent law should not be used for prohibiting
activity that may be regarded as objectionable on grounds unrelated to
patent law. 183 Opponents of patenting have attacked the patent system as
a means of voicing their concerns over biotechnology. Proponents of
patenting life realize that under the current regime a great deal hangs on
the maturity and wisdom of the PTO. That is not a comforting thought.
For those who see biotechnology as a method of furnishing benefits to
society, the patent system provides a much needed incentive for vigorous
pursuit of those ends.
[73] The proper forum for resolution of this issue and balancing these
competing interests is the Legislature. A chief task of Congress is to
promulgate legislation that maximizes the development and use of
biotechnology by means of the patent incentive, while minimizing the
potential risks by means of regulatory oversight. 184 The current case-bycase patent application evaluation, employing vague standards of review,
is ill suited to deal with biotechnological developments. 185

183

Issues such as abortion keep influencing patent policy. For example, Rep. Dave
Weldon (R-FL) sponsored an amendment to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2004, aimed to prevent the use of federal funds to issue patents on human organisms,
including embryos and fetuses. The vague, overly broad language does not define
“human organism” and it could preclude patenting of many human-derived
biotechnology inventions. 149 CONG. REC. E2417 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 2003) (statement
of Rep. Weldon).
184
The federal government already has guidelines on human experimentation. 45 C.F.R.
§ 46 (2004). These regulations are limited; they only apply to federally funded research
institutions, voluntarily complying institutions, or to pharmaceuticals or devices that need
FDA approval. See id. § 46.103.
185
Courts recently recognized that the invalidation of patents based on immorality
grounds is no longer widely used. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364,
1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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[74] The scope of patentable subject matter is currently determined by
application of principles spelled out in 35 U.S.C. § 103. 186 A possible
solution to the problem of patenting human-animal chimeras is to create a
standard-based statute that will regulate patenting of life forms. Such a
statute could be modeled on 35 U.S.C. § 103. 187 A standard-based
statutory provision is flexible and suitable for the rapidly-advancing field
of biotechnological innovation; it might allow for better accommodation
of the legal (patentability) treatment of future chimaeric creatures, such as
biomechanic hybrids and other types of organisms that we cannot now
envision.
[75] Patents do not confer property rights in genetic material as it exists in
nature and they do not sanction illegal acts. Instead of becoming mired in
moral and ethical controversies, critics of patenting the Minotaur should
call for more comprehensive regulations on genetic engineering, not a ban
on patenting of chimeras. Such a ban is unlikely to prevent further
experimentation in genetic engineering because acquiring patents is not
the only motivating factor in scientific research. 188 Significant driving
forces include the quest for knowledge, recognition, status and prestige. 189
[76] If necessary, evaluation of the public interest in issuing patents might
involve the creation of some body outside the PTO, whether an ethics
advisory council to the PTO or a body concerned both with patenting and
other areas of bioethics that are within federal jurisdiction. Lessons can be
learned from the ongoing policy debate on the incorporation of ethical
considerations in the regulation of genetically modified foods. 190
186

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004).
Id. Analogous to the non-obviousness statute, the standard-based statute can regulate
grants of patents on living organisms, and perhaps on living matter in general (cells,
tissues, organs, etc.).
188
As Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement explains, patents merely contribute to the
promotion of technology. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights art. 7, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81.
189
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10 (1988).
190
See PAUL B. THOMPSON, CANADIAN BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMM., FOOD AND
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available at
http://www.agriculture.purdue.edu/agbiotech/Thompsonpaper/Canadathompson.html
(discussing the ethical issues of genetically modified foods).
187
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[77] Under the current state of genetic engineering art, human-animal
chimeras could be created either through upward engineering of mammal
animals or through downward genetic manipulation of human embryos. 191
The implication is that created transgenic humanoids and chimeras “could
end up constituting a human underclass.” 192 In the absence of an
applicable statute, the attempt to patent such an invention has prompted
the PTO to disallow the patenting of human-animal chimeras. 193 It is
doubtful that the PTO is the appropriate agency for making policy
decisions of such scope and significance.
[78] The determination of what constitutes an immoral invention suffers
from ambiguity and subjectivity. As is the case with language, definitions,
and laws, (im)morality is society-dependent, and changes from generation
to generation. It should be no surprise that the use of the doctrine of social
utility in denying patents has, over the years, fallen out of favor with the
federal courts, if not with the PTO. 194 Despite its acceptance of patent
protection for animals and the strong language of Chakrabarty, the PTO
has declared that patent claims directed to or including in their scope a
human being would be denied. To legitimize this view, the PTO claimed
rationale in the Patent Act and on the Constitution. 195 The PTO’s reliance
on the eighteenth century view of a morality aspect of the utility
requirement is flawed, since it assumes that any utility inherent in such an
invention would necessarily violate public policy. 196 One is tempted to
guess that today’s conservative Supreme Court would be hesitant to
invoke a subjective doctrine, which has not seen much use over the last

191

Upward engineering of mammals already occurs in xenotransplantation. See Stevan
M. Pepa, International Trade and Emerging Genetic Regulatory Regimes, 29 L. & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 415, 445-6 (1998) (citing M. Schmoeckel et al., Xenotransplantation of Pig
Organs Transgenic for Human DAF: An Update, 29 TRANSPLANT PROC. 3157 (1997)).
192
Id. at 446. This proposition sounds morally repugnant; however, some have argued
that it is morally acceptable. Id.; see also Fishman, supra note 8, at 477-8.
193
James P. Daniel, Of Mice and “Manimal”: The Patent & Trademark Office’s Latest
Stance Against Patent Protection for Human-Based Inventions, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99,
100 (1999).
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See id. at 124-25.
195
Id. at 118.
196
It seems as if the PTO relied on both eighteenth century jurisprudence and eighteenth
century morality views.
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century. 197 Furthermore, the PTO, as an administrative agency, is not in a
position to make decisions regarding fundamental constitutional rights.
While the PTO may have valid concerns about the consequences of
granting patents for human-based inventions, no reasons for a wholesale
denial are persuasive. The PTO has not offered a rational basis for its
wholesale denial of human-based patents in the face of Supreme Court
language arguably holding otherwise. 198 Although there may be
arguments, both legal and ethical, against the patenting of a parallel
humanoid species, the PTO is not the organization to make such
determinations. 199
[79] Biotechnology issues new challenges to the PTO, the courts and
Congress to realize the constitutional mandate “to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.” 200 With technological progress in focus, the
traditional patent doctrine should be updated to accommodate the
contemporary biotechnological innovations. Patent scope definitions
should be fashioned to encourage new inventions. Instead of relying on
the PTO and the courts to make ad hoc decisions concerning the
constitutionality of inventions based on life forms, Congress should either
proscribe patent protection for these inventions, or statutorily limit patent
protection in a certain field of technology. To eliminate ethical/moral
debates, Congress might choose to prescribe a sui generis system for
patenting biotech inventions. Until Congress takes an affirmative action
or publicly refuses to do so, human-based inventions will remain subject
to the PTO’s wholesale prohibition, no matter how misdirected it may
be. 201
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A cynical view might be that the Rehnquist Supreme Court has more often than not
upheld conservative views of the world.
198
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See Benjamin D. Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The
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see also Daniel, supra note 193, at 116.
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201
It is worth mentioning that another federal agency, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), has claimed jurisdiction over human cloning; this assertion has been criticized as
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needs what the FDA calls ‘Investigative New Drug’ authority, really a license to conduct
clinical trials of new drugs. But if no new drugs are used, it is hard to see why.”
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[80] The real issue is not about the granting of patents to life forms. The
critics of the very notion of patenting life must realize that prohibiting
such patents will not stop researchers from advancing the frontiers of
biotechnology. On the contrary, allowing a patent on the Minotaur might
help achieve better regulation, because in absence of patent protection, the
proliferation of biotechnology is not controlled. The vocal opponents of
patents on life forms must ask themselves whether it is the mere thought
of owning life that is abhorrent or if the problem lies in a more
fundamental technological and metaphysical uneasiness. Attacking patent
law addresses the former concern but has little effect on the latter.
Opponents should focus their efforts not on altering the patent laws, but on
convincing Congress to pass legislation that would regulate the kinds of
genetic engineering experiments that scientists may perform. 202 That
might keep the Minotaur in the labyrinth for the time being, sparing the
lives of a few heroes until we reach the next level of cognitive
development.
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This will not be easy. The United Nations recently “ducked the issue of whether to
attempt to regulate human cloning,” delaying drafting a treaty on the subject. Gretchen
Vogel, U.N. Procrastinates on Cloning Ban, SCI. NOW, Nov. 6, 2003, at 1, available at
http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/2003/1106/2.
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